SECOND
DIVISION
ESTEFANIO
BIASURA, G.R. No. 146385
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
*AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH
42,
GREGORIO,
FEDERICO, JULIO Promulgated:
and
ROGELIO, all surnamed DE
VERA,
Respondents. August
17, 2006
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D E C I S I
O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to reverse the decision of the Fourteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 55086.
We first advert
to the facts.
In June 1984,
a cadastral survey of San Fabian, Pangasinan was
undertaken. A parcel of land with an approximate area of 88,000 square
meters was included and designated as Lot No. 20203, Cad. 510-D, San Fabian, Pangasinan.[1]
On
On
On
On
Aggrieved, the
private respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the Regional Trial Court on
Undaunted,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, assailing
the trial court’s decision.[17] The petition was raffled to the Fourteenth
Division of the appellate court and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55086.[18]
In its
decision on
The
petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision considering that the DENR Director only committed an error in
judgment which should be corrected via
an ordinary appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not
by petition for certiorari.[22]
The petitioner also argues that the private respondents failed to show that the
DENR Director gravely abused his discretion in making his decisions and order.[23]
On the other
hand, private respondents contend that: (1) as the trial court’s decision is
already final as to the DENR Director, petitioner does not have the legal
personality to institute the petition; and (2) the records show the existence
of grave abuse of discretion, hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
the proper remedy.[24]
We deny the
petition.
An aggrieved party may avail of the writ of certiorari
when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[25]
In certiorari proceedings,
the court’s query is limited to a determination of whether the respondent
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolution or
decision. Generally, a superior court
does not assess or weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the respondent
tribunal, board or officer based its or his resolution or decision.[26]
Trite is the rule that administrative
findings of fact are accorded great respect and even finality when supported by
substantial evidence. However, when it
appears that an administrative body has grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the court, on certiorari,
should not hesitate to reverse its factual findings. Factual findings of administrative agencies
are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.[27]
In the case
at bar, the Regional Trial Court correctly took cognizance of the petition for certiorari
filed by private respondents. The
patent error committed by the DENR Director in awarding to petitioner a piece
of property different from that proved by his evidence is not merely an error
of judgment but an error of jurisdiction that is a proper ground for a petition
for certiorari. As found by
the trial court:
In
the decision [of the DENR Director,] it must be observed that what property was
declared in the name of Estefanio Biasura
of which he was the absolute owner was not specified. On top of that the number of the tax
declaration supposed to have been already issued in his name was not
mentioned. It should be said, however,
that the tax declaration adduced by Biasura during
the hearing of October 2, 1990 before Land Investigator Crisanto
Fuertes was Tax Declaration No. 1787. It did not refer to either Tax Declaration
No. 4670 or 4671 or both because the latter two tax declarations were issued
only on December 17, 1990 and, therefore, still inexistent on November 15,
1990, the date of the questioned decision.
Simply put, it was not
Thus, the questioned decision of May
31, 1991 temporarily lifting the order of March 8, 1991 and giving full force
and effect to the decision of November 15, 1990 and further directed that
claimant-protestant Estefanio Biasura
should file application for titling within a period of 30 days from receipt of
the decision has no legal leg to stand on.
To contend otherwise would defy logic.
While it may be true that the subject of the investigation was
It is basic and fundamental under our law on evidence that what was not proved
could not be granted or awarded.
Furthermore, the occupation and possession of Estefanio
Biasura of
This special order very clearly
stated that he was discharged from the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
October 1, 1984 after completion of 33 years military service and was therefore
enlisted in the Army sometime in 1951 and it would be of common knowledge that
a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines would be transferred from one
place to another. Even assuming that
he would go to San Fabian once in a while[,] he could have not stayed on
Consequently,
we also find that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court after finding that the decision of the DENR Director
awarded Lot No. 20203 to herein petitioner based on evidence pertaining to a
parcel of land entirely distinct from Lot No. 20203.
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On official business.
[1] Rollo, p. 31.
[2] Rollo, pp. 31-32, 48.
[3] Rollo, p. 32.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[6] Rollo, p. 65.
[7] Rollo, p. 35.
[8] Rollo, pp. 35, 52-54.
[9] Rollo, pp. 55-64.
[10] Rollo,
pp. 55, 67.
[11] Rollo,
p. 40.
[12] Rollo,
pp. 40, 65-67.
[13] Rollo,
pp. 68-72.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Rollo,
pp. 76-102.
[16] Rollo,
p. 97.
[17] Rollo,
pp. 103-108.
[18] Rollo,
pp. 43-45.
[19] Rollo,
pp. 43-45.
[20] Rollo,
pp. 109-118.
[21] Rollo,
p. 120.
[22] Rollo,
pp. 13-18.
[23] Rollo,
pp. 19-21.
[24] Rollo,
pp. 146-148.
[25] Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of
Court.
[26] Aklan
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439,
[27] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 117038,
[28] Rollo, pp. 93-95.